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Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms 
CARL TOBIAS" 
The Contract With America figured prominently in the Republican 
Party's victories in the 1994 congressional races. During the opening 
days of the 104th Congress, therefore, approximately one hundred spon-
sors introduced the Common Sense Legal Refonns Act (CSLRA), 
which embodied several measures that comprised the Contract's ninth 
precept.1 The only constituent of this package of proposals which 
actually became law was the Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act 
(PSLRA).2 Both Houses of Congress did pass products liability refonn 
bills but lacked the requisite votes to override President Bill Clinton's 
veto.3 The House of Representatives approved the Attorney Account-
ability Act (AAA), which would have modified the substantial 1993 
amendment in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governing sanctions; 
Federal Rule 68 covering offers of judgment; and an evidentiary re-
quirement that the Supreme Court interpreted in 1993.4 
The Republican Party eaptured additional seats in the Senate and 
retained a slight majority in the House of Representatives in the 1996 
elections; however, the Grand Old Party has insufficient votes to over-
ride vetoes which might be exercised by President Clinton, who won 
re-election. It was, thus, unclear that Republicans would reintroduce a 
products liability bill or the AAA, or would offer other substantive or 
procedural reform measures. Although the leaders of both political 
parties made conciliatory overtures immediately after the 1996 elections, 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Hanle 
Waters for valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wllmuton for processing this 
piece; as well as Ann and Tom Boone and tire Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. 
Errors that remain are mine. 
I. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995). 
2._ See Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737 
(1995) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA]. 
3. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (l995); S. 565, 104th Cong. (1995); see also John E. Yang. 
House Fails to Override Liability Veto, WASH. POST, May 10, 1996, at A23. 
4. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995); see also FED. R. av. P. l l(c); FED. R. av. P. 68; 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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Republican members introduced several important legal reform propos-
als at the outset of the 1 OS th Congress. These measures would individ-
ually and synergistically have important impacts on considerable federal 
civil litigation and the civil justice system. For example, the proposals' 
sponsors apparently introduced the measures with minimal understand-
ing of how they could affect several significant, continuing public and 
private reform efforts, most notably the Civil Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA) of 1990 which is scheduled to sunset in 1997. 
The reforms' passage, therefore, might have numerous adverse im-
pacts, such as further fragmenting the already fractured character of 
federal civil procedure. Some of the proposals' strictures could even 
have effects opposite froni those which sponsors intended and those 
expressly prescribed in the CJRA by, for instance, increasing cost and 
delay in civil litigation. The new measures, thus, may be symptomatic 
of much that is presently wrong with the civil justice process and 
might exacerbate certain problems. Notwithstanding several of the 
complications enumerated, Congress's composition apparently affords 
opportunities for bipartisan cooperation which could lead to the adop-
tion of legal reforms. The above factors mean that the recently intro-
duced proposals deserve analysis. This Article undertakes that effort. 
This Article's first section describes the background of the new 
legal reforms, emphasizing those ongoing public and private initiatives 
with which important aspects of the recent measures may conflict. The 
second section descriptively evaluates the substantive and procedural 
provisions of the PSLRA and the latest proposals and examines the 
detrimental impacts which these strictures may have on continuing re-
form efforts, particular cases, and the civil justice system. 
This section determines· that numerous requirements in the measures 
alone and together could adversely affect plaintiffs and parties with 
limited resources or power, such as civil rights litigants by, for exam-
ple, restricting their access to federal court. The proposals individually 
and in combination might also have deleterious impacts on the civil 
justice process. They may conflict with ongoing reform endeavors, and 
increase complexity and disuniformity in federal civil procedure, which 
will correspondingly impose greater expense and delay. 
The third section, accordingly, offers recommendations for the fu-
ture, which principally involve attempts to resolve problems that the 
recent measures present. These suggestions primarily call upon Con-
gress to reject the AAA and the products liability proposal or delay 
passage of their prescriptions which would have the disadvantageous 
effects delineated above while rescinding, or discontinuing implementa-
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tion of, the PSLRA's provisions that are having those impacts. If 
Congress believes that the two new refonns' effectuation will not have, 
and that the PSLRA has not had, detrimental effects on continuing 
initiatives, considerable civil litigation, or the civil justice system, or if 
it decides to proceed for different reasons, Congress must at least eval-
uate other possibilities. For instance, Congress should attempt to har-
monize the proposals' requirements with ongoing refonn efforts, namely 
the CJRA which may expire soon. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL REFORMS 
Those legal refonns that constitute the backdrop against which the 
sponsors of the recent measures drafted and introduced the proposed 
legislation require relatively thorough examination in this essay, even 
though their origins and development have been rather comprehensively 
evaluated elsewhere.5 Comparatively extensive treatment is warranted 
because most of the earlier refonns have lengthy, complicated histories, 
and these enhance comprehension of the recent proposals, especially by 
showing how legislators who introduced them apparently did so with 
minimal appreciation of the prior efforts. This section mainly explores 
procedural refonns, by initially examining the processes for promulgat-
ing and amending federal civil procedures and implicating federal civil 
justice refonn, and secondarily considers substantive reforms, by evalu-
ating initiatives relating to products liability law. 
A. Procedural Reforms 
1. Processes for Promulgating and Amending Federal Procedures 
Congress adopted the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which empow-
ered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice for civil litiga-
tion in the federal district courts, after years of controversial discus-
sion. 6 The Court named the original Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules (Advisory Committee) that consisted of fourteen practicing attor-
5. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope O-.·er F.xperience: Mandatory lnfonnal Dlsca..-ery and 
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 
1990 Judicial Improvements Act, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589 (1994). 
6. See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stnt. 1064 (1934) (current version nt 
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994)). See generally Stephen B. Bwbank, The Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com-
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure In Historical Perspecth'e, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 
909 (1987). 
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neys and law faculty during 1935.7 This group concluded its draft of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937. The Court subscribed to 
the requirements essentially as tendered, and the strictures took effect 
during 1938.8 The Committee intended to draft procedures which 
would be simple, uniform, and trans-substantive and which would pro-
mote prompt, economical, and merit-based resolution of civil disputes.9 
The Federal Rules required that all federal district courts employ the 
same procedures; 10 however, Rule 83 authorized each district to pre-
scribe local procedures, which could erode the uniform, simple proce-
dural scheme which the drafters envisioned. 11 
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The Federal Rules appeared to function effectively for the initial 
three decades after their adoption, 12 but several developments fostered 
increasing dissatisfaction with the procedures by the mid-1970s. Nu-
merous judges and practitioners and a few commentators asserted that 
the federal courts were encountering a litigation explosion in which 
lawyers and litigants were pursuing substantial numbers of suits, too 
many of which lacked merit. 13 Certain judges and attorneys were trou-
bled by abuse of the civil justice system and suggested that courts 
sanction those who perpetrated abuse, while critics claimed that the 
uniform, simple procedural regime embodied in the Rules encouraged 
these problems. 14 A number of observers also expressed concern about 
7. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note ·6, at 970-73; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation arid the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 272-73 (1989). 
8. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 6, at 970-93; Tobias, supra note 7, at 273. 
9. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of 
the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 718 (1975); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure In 
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 502-15 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era In Ameri-
can Civil Procedure, 61 A.BA. J. 1648, 1649-51 (1981). 
10. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 9, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 7, at 274-75. 
11. See FED. R. av. P. 83 (authorizing districts to adopt local rules that are not inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules). That restriction has been honored in the breach. See 1985 
amendment of FED. R. av. P. 83, advisory committee's note. 
12. See Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958). 
See generally Resnik, supra note 9, at 516; Tobias, supra note 7, at 277-78. 
13. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 
in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN TIIE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo Levin & 
Russell Wheeler eds., 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Inten-
tions Gone Awry?, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FtmJRE, 
supra, at 211-12; see also Tobias, supra note 7, at 287-89 (reviewing debate over litigation ex-
plosion). 
14. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Order 
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil. Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 
(1984). 
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complications attributable to the proliferation of local procedures. is 
Some of these strictures, an overwhelming majority of which federal 
districts have adopted since 1975, conflicted with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, requirements in the United States Code, or local provi-
sions in additional federal districts. 
The Judicial Conference of the United States, which is the federal 
courts' policymaking arm, invoked several responses to these concerns. 
The Conference orchestrated promulgation of the 1983 revisions to 
Federal Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26, which were meant to be an integrated 
package that would expand lawyers' duties as officers of the court and 
increase judicial control over civil litigation, especially in the pretrial 
process.16 Rules 16 and 26 respectively enhanced courts' power during 
pretrial conferences and discovery.17 The revisions authorized judges to 
impose sanctions for the Rules' violations, while Rule 11 commanded 
judges to sanction those who did not perform reasonable prefiling in-
quiries or who filed inadequate papers.18 
The Judicial Conference responded in two ways to the complica-
tions presented by local procedural proliferation. The Conference spon-
sored Rule 83's revision that permitted districts to adopt or revise local 
rules, only after affording public notice and opportunity for comment, 
and prescribed individual judges' standing orders which contravened the 
Federal Rules or local rules.19 The Conference also established the 
Local Rules Project which collected and evaluated 5000 local rules, 
many of which conflicted with the Federal Rules, and numerous addi-
tional local requirements that governed practice in the districts.20 
A number of judges, lawyers, and writers evinced mounting dissat-
isfaction with the national rule revision process, and congressional ac-
15. See, e.g., ND. CAL R. 235-7, reprinted in Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a 
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 
770, 776-77 & n30 (1981). See generally Carl Tobias. Chlil Justice &form and the 
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. LI. 1393 (1992). 
16. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter 1983 Order); Subrin, supra note 9, at 1650. See generally ARTHUR. R. l\1Ju.ER, THE 1983 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE: PRO~!OTlNG EfFEcnVE CAsE 
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER REsPONSIBILl1Y (1984). 
17. See 1983 Order, 461 U.S. at 1097. 
18. See id. 
19. See FED. R. C!v. P. 83. 
20. See COMMITIEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUD!ClAL Co~CE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LocAL RULES PROJECT: LocAL RULES o:-: 0V1L PROCEDURE 1 
(1989); see also Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Lccal Ruler, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 
62 (providing summary of Local Rules Project). 
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tivity probably reflected this concem.21 During 1973, Congress inter-
vened in that process by passing legislation which replaced the Federal 
Rules of Evidence that the Supreme Court had promulgated, thus vitiat-
ing much work of Judicial Conference committees.22 During 1974, 
Congress postponed for one year the date on which revised Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure were to become effective.23 In the 1980s, 
Congress altered the Court's amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 4.24 
Five decades after the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took 
effect, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act (JIA) of 1988. 
The JIA was meant to modernize and open the national and local pro-
cedural amendment processes.25 The legislation was intended to im-
prove federal rule revision and to revitalize, and restore the primacy of, 
the national rule amendment process by opening it to enhanced public 
participation, essentially assimilating the procedures to notice-comment 
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.26 Congress con-
comitantly attempted to reduce local procedural proliferation by impos-
ing requirements on the promulgation and modification of local proce-
dures which were analogous to those for Federal Rule revision.27 The 
legislation also required that every circuit judicial council periodically 
review for consistency a!I. local procedures and abrogate or change 
those considered to conflict.28 
21. See Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 16 COLUM. L. 
REV. 905 (1976); see also WINIFRED R. BROWN, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF nm U.S., FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (1981); Tobias, supra note 5, at 1598. 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27-29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 
5987-89; see also Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat 1926 (1974). In 1993, an Advisory Committee 
on Federal Rules of Evidence was. reactivated. See 150 F.R.D. 330 {1994); see also 141 
F.R.D. 282 (1993). 
23. See Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat 397 (1974); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Mak-
ing Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975). Congress has since fre· 
quently intervened to "delay the effective date of, disapprove, or modify rules and amend-
ments." H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987. 
24. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 
Stat 2527 {1983) (codified as l!lllended at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)); see also Paul D. 
Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733 
(1988) {analyzing prospects for Rule 4 reform). 
25. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 1599; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994); H.R. 
REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987. See generally Mullenix, 
supra note 5, at 830-32. 
26. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994). 
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 notes (1994). Districts were to appoint advisory committees and 
to apply public notice and comment procedures. 
28. See id. § 332{d){4); see also id. § 2071(c)(1). 
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The initial test of the JIA's changes in the national rule revision 
process led to adoption of the 1993 Federal Rules revisions.29 I em-
phasize Rule 11 's 1983 amendment because it became the most contro-
versial modification in the Federal Rules' history and because one of 
the recent reform proposals would substantially change the 1993 amend-
ment; essentially reinstituting the 1983 version.30 Rule 11 's 1983 revi-
sion proved controversial when many lawyers seized on confusion re-
garding the amendment's primary purpose and invoked the Rule to seek 
recovery of attorneys' fees, while numerous judges granted those re-
quests and made attorney-fee shifting the preferred sanction.JI The 
pursuit of compensation encouraged much costly, unnecessary satellite 
litigation unrelated to the merits of lawsuits,J2 as did the revision's 
ambiguous wording and inconsistent judicial construction.J3 Lawyers 
also used Rule 11 for tactical purposes, such as threatening less power-
ful parties in ways that were meant to discourage their avid pursuit of 
litigation.34 These considerations disadvantaged, and even chilled the 
enthusiasm of, resource-poor litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs.JS 
The 1983 revision apparently offered certain advantages, such as deter-
ring the filing of frivolous cases.J6 
The national rule revisors, especially the Advisory Committee, 
which had primary responsibility for developing proposals for changes 
in the Rules, seemed to effectuate faithfully and efficaciously the JIA's 
29. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of C"IVil 
Procedure and Fonns, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amendments]. 
30 .. Rule 26's 1993 revision to impose automatic disclosure was important See Infra notes 
49-53. Rule 4 was also substantially changed. See supra note 24 nnd nccompanying text 
31. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RuLE 11: FINAL RfroRT TO 
ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON CML Rm.Es OF lHE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF lHE UNITED STATES 
§ IB, at 9 (1991) (stating that attorneys' fees were snnction of choice); Melissa L Nclkcn. 
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule I I-Some "Chilling" Problems In the Struggle Between 
Compensation and Punishment, 14 GEO. LI. 1313 (1986) (discussing confusion). 
32. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, 77:e Transformation of American Ch:ll Procedure: 11:e 
F.xample of Rule ll, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Carl Tobias, Rule Jl and 
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 514 (1988-89). 
33. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 32, at 1930-31; Carl Tobias, Cil'll Righu Plaintiffs and 
the Proposed Revision of Rule Jl, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1775, 1776 (1992). 
34. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule Jl, 46 U. MIAMI L REv. SSS, 876-77 
(1992); see also Nelken, supra note 31, at 1327, 1340. 
35. See, e.g., Nelken. supra note 31, at 1327 (suggesting that Rule 11 is invoked, nnd sanc-
tions levied, against these plaintiffs more often than any class of civil litigant); Tobias, supra 
note 32, at 503-06; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule ll: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.RD. 189, 200-01 
(1988). 
36. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, 77:e New Cert!ficatlon Standard Under Rule Jl, 130 F.RD. 
479 (1990); William W Schwaner, Rule ll Revis/led, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988). 
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strictures relating to the revision process. The Committee was respon-
sive to public criticism of its draft proposals and apparently made good 
faith efforts to improve them.37 The Advisory Committee wrote numer-
ous drafts, conscientiously consulted public input, and attempted to 
develop the fairest, clearest change conceivable.38 Indeed, the Commit-
tee's efforts constitute the type of open, responsive amendment process 
and rational decisionmaking which Congress contemplated when modi-
fying the rule revision process in the 1988 Act.39 Notwithstanding the 
Committee's laudable efforts, many individuals and groups continued to 
criticize the 1993 revision.4° For instance, Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who dissented from the Supreme Court's transmittal of 
the amended Rule, claimed that it would "eliminate a significant and 
necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation.•'4t 
The 1993 amendment significantly improved the 1983 revision. 
The 1993 modification has reduced incentives to invoke Rule 11 im-
properly and concomitantly decreased cost and delay attributable to 
satellite litigation. For example, the 1993 version has a safe harbor for 
parties that purportedly contravene the Rule, entrusts sanctioning for 
violations of the provision to judicial discretion, and severely circum-
scribes those situations in which judges can levy the sanction of 
attorney's fees.42 The 1993 revision was a balanced, efficacious com-
promise, given the pragmatic restraints on rule revision, such as the 
need to satisfy. constituencies as diverse as the federal bench and 
plaintiffs' and defense attorneys.43 
37. It even inverted the nonnal rule revision sequence for Rule 11 by requesting public 
comment before drafting a proposal. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990). 
38. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., 
Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 419, 460 (July 1992) 
[hereinafter 1992 Proposed Amendments]; see also Tobias, supra note 34, at 859-65; Carl 
Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. LJ. 171 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, 
1993 Revision]. 
39. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text See generally Laurens Walker, A Com-
prehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455 (1993). 
40. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 38, at 186-88. 
41. 1993 Amendments, supra note 29, at 507-10 (dissenting statement). 
42. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra 
note 33, at 1783-88. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the amendment has had its intended 
effects. See Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 12. 
43. Since 1990, the Committee has been drafting a major revision of Rule 23 governing 
class actions and recently issued a draft. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of 
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The strictures respecting local rule revision in the 1988 JIA have 
received rather limited implementation.44 Practically all of the ninety-
four districts have appointed local advisory committees. Numerous 
courts have formalized processes for adopting and revising local proce-
dures and have opened them to public involvement, while some districts 
have prescribed new, or amended existing, local procedures pursuant to 
the processes. A few courts have implemented the JIA's mandates relat-
ing to local procedural proliferation.45 For example, a tiny number of 
districts have attempted to restrict local procedures, and virtually none 
have abrogated or changed ,conflicting local requirements. The Seventh 
and Ninth Circuit Judicial Councils may be the only ones which have 
abolished or modified local district procedures. Several factors probably 
explain this implementation. Perhaps most significant, civil justice re-
form initiatives, primarily instituted by Congress in the 1990 CJRA, 
essentially suspended the efforts of local rules committees and circuit 
judicial councils which might have treated local proliferation. 
2. Federal Civil Justice Reform 
Congress passed the CJRA of 1990 out of increasing concern about 
expense and delay in civil litigation.46 The measure mandated that each 
district prescribe a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, which 
might include eleven statutorily provided procedures, primarily govern-
ing judicial case management, discovery and alternatives to dispute 
resolution (ADR), and additional techniques which could save cost or 
time.47 The CJRA implicitly encouraged districts to apply measures 
which conflict with the F~eral Rules, provisions in the United States 
Code, and strictures in other courts.48 Numerous districts adopted vary-
Civil Procedure 23, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 523, 535 (1996). See generally Symposium. 77re 
Institute of Judicial Administration Research Conference on Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 
(1996). 
44. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note S, at 1604-06, nnd Qui 
Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 
359 (1995). 
45. See Tobias, supra note 5, at ·1604-06. 
46. See id.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994). 
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1994). Districts adopted plans by December 1993 nnd then ex-
perimented. See id. § 471 notes. The CJRA also created new entities, circuit review com-
mittees, to monitor district implementation and assigned the Judicial Conrcrcnce similar duties. 
See id. § 474; see also Tobias, supra note 15, at 1406-11. 
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1994); see also Id. § 2071 (requiring local rules to be "consistent 
with Acts of Congress" and Federal Rules). See generally Pnul D. Carrington. A New Confed-
eracy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE LJ. 929 (1996); Lauren K. Robel, Frac-
tured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994). 
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ing combinations of the prescribed procedures, and some courts applied 
additional measures pursuant to the twelfth open-ended provision. For 
example, quite a few districts relied on the enumerated prescriptions, 
particularly those governing discovery, to adopt inconsistent local proce-
dures which implemented automatic disclosure, a novel and controver-
sial discovery mechanism.49 
Experimentation with disclosure became especially troubling because 
the national rule revisors were simultaneously proposing an amendment 
to Federal Rule 26 which would have imposed disclosure nationwide.50 
The revision entities eventually prescribed a Federal Rule amendment 
which was meant to accommodate CJRA experimentation by allowing 
all ninety-four districts to alter the provision or to reject it.51 Because 
Congress did not change the revision transmitted and many districts had 
apparently failed to plan for other contingencies, much confusion 
arose.52 Districts adopted numerous variations of disclosure, and some 
courts eschewed it; these developments have increased inconsistency, 
expense, and delay.53 . 
The Eastern District of Texas most boldly and expressly asserted its 
authority to promulgate conflicting local procedures by proclaiming that, 
insofar as the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with 
[the Court's] Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling."54 The 
district adopted and held valid against challenge a settlement offer pro-
vision which conflicted with Rule 68.55 
The problems that arose when all ninety-four districts adopted a 
broad array of disparate procedures were exacerbated because many 
judges have inconsistently interpreted the provisions, and some did not 
49. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. & BANKR. COURT FOR 11IB DIST. OF IDAHO, CIVIL JUSTICE Ex· 
PENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10-11 (Dec. 19, 1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 11IB E. 
DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4-S (Dec. 17, 1991). 
SO. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., 
Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 137 F.RD. S3, 87·88 
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed Amendments]; see also Tobias, supra note S, at 1611. 
SI. See 1993 Amendments, supra note 29, at 431; see also Tobias, supra note S, at 1612. 
S2. See Tobias, supra note S, at 1612-14. 
S3. See id. at 1614-IS. 
S4. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 11IB E. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 9 (Dec. 20, 1991). 
SS. See id. at 8; see also Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 88S F. Supp. 934 
(E.D. Tex. 199S) (upholding validity of Civil Justice Expense and Delay Plan procedure adopt· 
ed under the CJRA, despite the fact that it differs from the Federal Rules). But see Ashland 
Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261 (Sth Cir. 1997) (invalidating local attorney fee-shifting 
rule adopted under the CJRA because CJRA did not authorize it). See generally Carrington, 
supra note 48. 
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apply certain measures which their courts had prescribed.56 Lawyers 
and litigants have also encountered problems finding, comprehending, 
and complying with the relevant local requirements.57 These develop-
ments, particularly the increasingly complicated and disuniform nature 
of federal civil procedure, have apparently increased cost and delay in 
civil litigation. This has been true for most attorneys and parties, but 
it has especially disadvantaged those with few resources or those that 
litigate in multiple districts.58 The developments also show how the 
1990 CJRA.'s implementation essentially suspended effectuation of those 
aspects of the .1988 JIA which were meant to treat local procedural 
proliferation.59 For example, circuit judicial councils might have been 
reluctant to scrutinize, much less abrogate, conflicting local strictures 
which the 1990 statute seemed to authorize.60 Indeed, the Si>.'th Circuit 
Council suspended its review of local rules pending the receipt of 
greater guidance from Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law 
on whether the CJRA superseded the Federal Rules.61 
B. Substantive Reforms 
1. Products Liability 
The fifty states have traditionally articulated and changed substan-
tive products liability law. State supreme courts have assumed major 
responsibility for enunciating and altering products liability doctrine, 
primarily through case law and common law development.62 The 1965 
56. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 1621. 
57. See id.; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1422-25. 
58. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1422-25; see also Tobias, supra note 32, n1 495-98. 
59. See supra notes 27-28, 44-45 and accompanying text. 
60. The CJRA also created analogous entities, circuit review committees, and nssigned them 
similar oversight responsibilities. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
61. See United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the 
Judicial Council 4-5 (May 4, 1994); see also Carl Tobias, A Sixlh Circuit Story, 23 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REv. 983 (1996) [hereinafter Tobias, Sixlh]. The Bush Administration experimented "ith 
civil justice reform in the executive branch. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 
(1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994). See generally Carl Tobias, F.xecutil"e Branch 
Civil Justice Refonn, 42 AM. U. L REv. 1521 (1993). President Clinton essentially subscnocd 
to this effort. See Exec. Order No. 12,988, reprbited bi 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729 (1996). Execu-
tive Branch civil justice reform is less relevant to the issues that 1 analyze in this essay. 
Many ideas above regarding federal procedural revision processes and civil justice reform may 
be relevant to analogous processes and reforms in many states; however, they have less 11pplica-
bility to the issues treated in this essay. See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal 
Refonns, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699, 717 (1995) [hereinafter Tobias, Common Sense]. 
62. See WILLIAM PROSSER & w. PAGE KEEToN, PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 677-724 (5th ed. 1984). 
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adoption of the Restatement of Torts Second section 402A by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) greatly affected products liability law, 
and its formulation of the strict liability basis literally swept the coun-
try. 63 Nearly all of the states have adopted some variation of the Re-
statement articulation; however, a few follow the common law enuncia-
tion of strict liability which the California Supreme Court adopted in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.64 Many state legislatures have 
passed statutes which alter certain features of the case law doctrine of 
strict products liability or which codify some aspects of the Restatement 
formulation. 65 
The strict liability base of products liability has been rather contro-
versial. Numerous courts and some commentators have apparently 
found the strict manner in which liability has been imposed for prod-
ucts defects too inflexible.66 Manufacturers and other defendants have 
claimed that strict liability unfairly exposes them to excessive liability, 
substantially elevates the cost of insurance, and complicates efforts to 
design, manufacture, advertise, and sell products. 67 
The ALI recently approyed a Restatement Third of Torts governing 
products liability.68 The drafts produced by the project's reporters, 
working with a group of advisors, proved to be somewhat controversial 
for several reasons. 69 Numerous observers claimed that the Restate-
ment's proposed language limited too greatly the strict liability base 
and could even return products liability law to negligence in certain 
63. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 
62, at 694 (asserting section 402A swept the country); Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Products 
Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1994) (swnc). 
64. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The State of Alaska follows Greenman. See, e.g., Shanks 
v. Upjohn, 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 {Alaska 1992). 
65. See, e:g., MT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-719 to -720 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-1 
to C-5 (West 1989). See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAlS ON 
TORTS 808 {9th ed. 1994). 
66. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W .2d 176 (Mich. 1984) (applying a pure 
negligence, risk-utilify test in products liability action when liability is predicated on defective 
design); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (holding manufacturer of FDA-ap· 
proved drugs immune from strict liability claims based on design defects due to the inherent 
dangerousness of prescription drugs); James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Col· 
lapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure lo Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 271-
73 (1990). 
67. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: nm LEGAL REVOLUJ10N AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(1988); W. KIP VISCUS!, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 37-41 (1991). 
68. See REsTATEMENT {TulRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Official Draft, 
1~~ . 
69. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT {TulRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Draft No. I, 1993); 
REsTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. I, 1993). 
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respects.70 Additional critics asserted that some phrasing of the provi-
sion and aspects of its attendant commentary did not restate the law, 
which they contend prescribes strict liability.71 After several relatively 
contentious floor debates, the ALI membership agreed to adopt the 
reporters' work product.72 
2. Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting can be described as substantive or procedural. Howev-
er, it warrants terse treatment here because no pure fee-shifting provi-
sion appeared in the final versions of any legal reforms that the 104th 
Congress considered.73 The American Rule which, absent statute or 
contract, prohibits the losing litigant from paying the winning party's 
attorney's fees, has traditionally governed fee shifting.74 Congress has 
generally left fee shifting to the states, but it has passed some 200 
statutes which prescribe fee shifting.75 Most of these measures provide 
for fee shifting to encourage the pursuit of litigation which vindicates 
significant social policies. For example, Congress has inserted fee-shift-
ing provisions in civil rights legislation to promote suit by individuals 
and groups who have suffered discrimination and to deter those who 
may discriminate from doing so. Congress has also prescribed fee 
shifting in environmental statutes to facilitate environmental cleanup or 
70. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 63, at 1113; Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of /he Law of 
Products Liability: The AU Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 695-96 (1995). 
71. See, e.g., Howard Klemme, Comments to /he Reporters and Selected Members of /he 
Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1173 
(1994); Laity S. Stewart, The American Law Institute and Products Liability: "Restatement or 
Reform"?, TRIAL, Sept 1994, at 29-30. 
72. See ALI Wraps Up Product Liability Project, 65 U.S.L.W. 2777 (1997); AU Hesitates 
On ltrnyer Liability, Products Liability Restatement Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W. 2734, 2735-36 (1994). 
Efforts to pass federal products liability legislation before 1995 deserve limited tremment as 
they are less relevant to the issues treated in this Article. See, e.g., Products Liability Fairness 
Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Tobias, Common Serue, supra note 61, at 
718 n.98. 
73. See Tobias, Common Sense, supra note 61, at 726, 729-31; see also H.R. 988, 104th 
Cong. § 2 (1995) (proposing limited fee shifting under Rule 68); in.fra note 85 and accompany-
ing text (creating presumption of fee-shifting for Rule 11 violations in securities litigation). 
74. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); 
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); see also John Leubsdort: Toward a History of the Amer-
ican Rule on Attorney Fee Recavery, 47 LAW & CoNm.lP. PROBS. 9, IS (Winter 1984). 
75. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also John F. 
Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Acce.s.s to Justice, 
42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1588 (1993). 
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to prevent pollution.76 
Concerns, including the litigation explosion, litigation abuse, manu-
facturers' exposure to liability in products liability cases mentioned 
above, 77 and basic fairness and increased litigation costs seem to under-
lie proposals which would require losing parties to pay their opponents' 
legal fees. A valuable example is the CSLRA's fee-shifting provision 
which would have empowered judges to award prevailing litigants in 
diversity cases reasonable attorneys' fees and to exercise judicial discre-
tion not to assess fees or to reduce their amount when special condi-
tions made awards unfair. 78 
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LEGAL REFORM PROPOSALS 
This section selectively analyzes the strictures included in the recent 
legal reforms. I descriptively evaluate the provisions, attempt to pro-
vide the reasons for the requirements' inclusion, and critically assess 
the strictures, especially in terms of their possible impacts on continu-
ing reforms. I first analyze the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, the only aspect of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act which 
became law, because this statute illustrates the effects that the new 
measures may have. I then consider the recent proposals. 
A. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
The securities litigation reform legislation is intended to change 
securities lawsuits in numerous important ways.79 The statute's features 
which are most relevant to the issues examined in this essay are the 
imposition of special pleading, sanctions, and class action requirements. 
Congress meant for the modifications to restrict the amount of abusive 
securities litigation, particul?f lY lawsuits which are lawyer-driven or are 
brought to extract settlements. 
76. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) 
(1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1994); see also Tobias, supra note 
7, at 313-17; Vargo, supra note 75, at 1587-89. 
77. See supra notes 13-14, 16-18, 67 and accompanying text 
78. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995). 
79. See PSLRA, supra note 2. See generally Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class 
Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 491 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet 
Sung, 51 Bus. LAw.- 975 (1996); Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 
ARiz. L. REv. 717 (1996). 
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The PSLRA requires that plaintiffs satisfy heightened pleading stan-
. dards in cases pursued under the 1933 and 1934 securities Jaws.8° For 
example, a plaintiff must "specifically plead with particularity each 
statement alleged to have been misleading," setting forth in detail the 
reason why the statement is misleading, while a plaintiff, when making 
an allegation premised on information and belief, "must state with par-
ticularity all facts in [its] possession on which the belief is formed."81 
Specialized pleading conflicts with the general notice pleading system 
of the FederaJ Rules, which the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, and 
erodes the Rules' trans-substantive nature.82 Imposing more burden-
some pleading has apparently discouraged plaintiffs from bringing fraud 
claims and undermined the securities statutes' purposes. 
The PSLRA also stays all discovery pending the resolution of mo-
tions to dismiss or for summary judgment to prevent the imposition of 
unnecessary discovery costs on defendants. 83 This stricture, in conjunc-
tion with particularized pleading, creates a "catch-22" for plaintiffs 
analogous to the one which arose under Rule 11 's 1983 revision:84 the 
PSLRA demands that plaintiffs plead with specificity, yet suspends 
discovery, thereby denying access to the very information that plaintiffs 
may need to so plead, much less to prove their cases. Moreover, sec-
80. See PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101; see also IS U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1994); H. CO~'F. REP. 
No. 104-369, at 41 (199S), reprinted in 199S U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. See generally Elliott J. 
Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 
ARiz. L. REv. 67S (1996). 
81. H. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (199S), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.c.A.N. 730, 740; 
see also Marksman Partners v. Chantal Phann. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (CD. Cnl. 1996) 
(finding heightened standards satisfied). See generally Paul M. Tyrrell & George L. de Verges, 
A Chilling Effect: 17ze Impact of the Motion lo Dismiss Under the Prh"ate Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, 173 F.R.D. SS6 (1997). 
82. See Leathennan v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, S07 U.S. 
163 (1993); see also Carl Tobias, 17ze Transformation of Trans..Substantfrlty, 49 WASH. & LE£ 
L. REv. 1501 (1992) (discussing trans-substantivity); Tobias, supra note 7, at 296-301 {discuss-
ing notice pleading regime). Federal Ruic 9(b) docs require that plaintiffs plead allegations of 
fraud with particularity, an idea that the PSLRA's sponsors pwportcdly intended to capture. 
See H. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (199S), reprinted in 199S U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. 
83. See PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101; see also H. CO?'.'F. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 730, 731; Medhekar v. United States DisL CL for the ND. 
Cal., 99 F 3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting discovery provision to include automatic disclo-
sure). See_ generally John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualljicatlon and Discov-
ery Stays Under the Reform Act, Si Bus. LAW. 1101, 113S-42 (1996); Tyncll & de Verges, 
supra note 81, at 558. 
84. See, e.g., Johnson v. United Slates, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt, J., dissent-
ing); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally Tobias, 
supra note 32, at 493-9S. 
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tion 101 modifies the sanctioning provision of Federal Rule 11 in sev-
eral ways to deter abusive securities cases. Most importantly, the 
PSLRA provides that the "court shall include in the record specific 
findings regarding compliance by each party and each attorney [with] 
each requirement of Rule ll(b) ... as to any complaint, responsive 
pleading, or dispositive motion," while the statute creates a presumption 
that prevailing parties will recover "all attorney's fees and costs in-
curred in the entire action" when litigation is found to be abusive. 85 
Section 101 of the PSLRA includes other requirements which are 
intended to prevent allegedly abusive practices that have been associat-
ed with securities class action litigation.86 For instance, certain of the 
legislation's strictures are meant to "encourage the most capable repre-
sentatives of the plaintiff class to participate in class action litigation 
and to exercise supervision .and control of the lawyers for the class."87 
These provisions for class actions and sanctions may impose several 
disadvantages which are analogous to those produced by particularized 
pleading. The strictures could dissuade many potential plaintiffs and 
their counsel from pursuing actions and undermine the securities legisla-
tion's objectives, while the mandates further erode the Federal Rules' 
trans-substantive character. The possibly corrosive impacts on national 
rule revision seem equally important. Legislating special requirements 
for class actions may disrupt or at least undercut the half-decade effort 
of the national revision entities and their expert advisors to analyze Rule 
23 closely, to conscientiously draft modifications in the class action 
mechanism, and to circulate and seek public input on several drafts. 88 
The partial amendment of Rule 11 so soon after the revisors meticulous-
ly changed the provision in 1993 could also discourage them.89 
85. H. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 738; 
see also PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101. The mandatory Rule 11 review will consume scarce 
resources of judges, lawyers, and litigants. See generally Olson et al., supra note 83, at 1132· 
34; Richard M. Phillips et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: 
Rebalancing Litigation Risks And Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, ·Defendants and La»}'ers, 
SI Bus. LAW. 1009, 1045-48 (1996). 
86. See PSLRA, supra no~ 2, § 101; see also H. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. See generally Phillips et al., supra note 85, at 
I 039-41, I 048-50. 
87. H. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 738; 
see also PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101; In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A. 96-CV-0633, 
1996 WL 515203, at *I (E.D. Pa Aug. 27, 1996) (permitting appointment of multiple lead 
plaintiffs). 
88. See supra note 43. 
89. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text 
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The imposition of numerous new strictures on securities litigation 
has apparently limited access to federal courts in additional ways which 
resemble those assessed earlier. As with civil justice reform, attorneys 
and clients must learn about, comprehend, and satisfy the requirements 
prescribed which will consume scarce time and resources.90 Similar to 
the 1983 revision of Federal Rule 11, the institution of new commands 
will probably encourage considerable unnecessary, costly satellite litiga-
tion implicating the mandates' meaning and application.91 Some anec-
dotal information indicates that plaintiffs have initiated fewer federal 
securities class actions and may have pursued less vigorously those 
cases filed.92 
B. Attorney Accountability Act of 1995 
1. Rule 11 Modification 
The AAA would have altered Rule 11 's 1993 revision by making the 
imposition of sanctions mandatory, not discretionary, thus reinstituting the 
1983 formulation, and by specifically stating that the sanctions awarded 
would be sufficient to "compensate the parties that were injured" as well 
as adequate to deter.93 A few justifications seem to underlie the modi-
fications which the AAA would institute.94 First, the changes should deter 
lawyers and litigants who~ a number of judges, attorneys, and parties 
believe might be tempted to violate Rule 11. Second, the alterations 
would apparently offer sufficient incentives for those harmed by Rule 
violations to invoke the provision. The modifications concomitantly rein-
force the foregoing concepts by removing judicial discretion not to levy 
sanctions generally or for compensatory reasons. 
90. See supra notes 57-58 and aCcompanying texl 
91. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying tcxl See SECURITIES & ExCH. CO~t'.t'N, RE-
PORT TO 1liE PRESIDENT AND 1liE CoNGRESS ON 1liE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE Uh'DER 1liE 
PRIVATE SECURITIES LmGAllON REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997) [hereinafter SEC REPoR.T). 
92. See Inteiview with Mark Gitenstein, Attorney with Mayer, Bro\\n & Platt, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Jan. 2, 1997); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 91; Hope Viner Sambom, Fear of 
Filing, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 28. But see Study Indicates No Decline in Federal Securities 
Class Suits, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 27, 1996). 
93. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995); see also 1983 amendment of FED. R. Ctv. P. 11, re-
printed in 97 F.R.D. 195, 197 (1983) (making mandatory judicial imposition of sanctions). 
94. I rely substantially in this paragraph on the dissenting statement to 1993 Amendments, supra 
note 29, at 507-10 (dissenting statement); Hearing on H.R. JO Before the Subcomm. on Courts 
and Intellectual Properly of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (testimony of Debra Ballen, Senior 
Vice President, American Insurance Ass'n) (Feb. 6, 1995); see al.so Duncan, supra note 42, at 
12. 
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Several problems accompany the proposals that sanctioning be man-
datory and that judges award sanctions to reimburse injured parties. 
The provision would revive the most troubling aspects of the 1983 
revision of Rule 11 and the precise features which the national rule 
revisors meant the 1993 amendment to eliminate or ameliorate. These 
include the incentives to use Rule 11 for compensatory and strategic 
reasons, which can foster unwarranted, costly satellite litigation and 
which can have chilling effects on some litigants, namely resource-poor 
parties.95 The two alterations may reinstitute the 1983 version's other 
disadvantages, such as the Rule's threat and retreat dimension, the pro-
vision's tendency to try attorneys not cases, and the increased incivility 
that it seemed to provoke.96 Those problems would adversely affect 
litigants, counsel, and judges in specific lawsuits and the civil justice 
system. 
Congressional enactment of these changes in Rule 11 might have 
even more deleterious impacts on the national rule revision process.97 
Rule 11 's 1993 modification evolved from an effort in which the revi-
sors clearly denominated a complication, carefully assessed it, drafted 
proposed alterations, solicited and examined much public comment, and 
prodigiously wrote drafts that they thought were responsive to public 
input and constituted the fairest, clearest provision which could be as-
sembled. The amendment ultimately adopted represented the finest 
effort of the revision committees and their expert advisors to address 
equitably and fully all of the interests that the changes would implicate 
and to fashion an effective compromise. The procedures fol-
lowed-inviting public scrutiny, thoroughly evaluating public input, and 
drafting proposed modifications in light of those recommenda-
tions-embodied the kind of open, rational decisionmaking process that 
Congress contemplated when passing the 1988 JIA. 
Legislative change of two important, carefully-considered dimen-
sions of the revisors' concerted efforts to improve Rule 11 so recently 
after the provision's substantial amendment and before it has even had 
an opportunity to operate would be unwarranted and detrimental. Con-
gressional reversal would directly undercut one of the JIA's central 
95. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text 
96. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE CoMM. ON QVJUTY OF THE SEVENTH FED. JUDICIAL CIR• 
CUIT 20-21 (Apr. 1991) (asserting idea regarding Rule 11 and civility); Tobias, supra note 33, 
at 1785 (asserting all three propositions). 
97. In this paragraph, I rely substantially on supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text. 
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purposes, making the national rule revision process paramount again.98 
Essential, peremptory legislative modification of such a controversial 
provision following so quickly upon gargantuan endeavors to reformu-
late it could eviscerate national rule amendment, additionally crippling 
those procedures at a time of substantial susceptibility and demoralizing 
many participants in the 1993 revision effort 99 
Enactment of this section of the AAA would also continue inadvis-
able, disruptive congressional intervention in the rule amendment pro-
cess.100 In 1995, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Dele-
gates actually promulgated a resolution urging Congress to reject the 
suggested changes in Rule 11 because modifications of Federal Rules 
"should be left to the existing rulemaking bodies."101 Passage of the 
AAA's Rule 11 alterations could concomitantly extend the unwise prac-
tice of too frequent procedural policymaking by Congress that adoption 
of the 1988 IlA and 1990 CJRA typifies.102 
2. Rule 68 Modification 
Another section of the AAA would have amended Rule 68 by per-
mitting courts to require parties that reject offers of judgment but re-
cover less than those offers at trial to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
of their opponents in diversity cases, although judges would have dis-
cretion not to levy such fees or to decrease the amount when special 
circumstances make awards unjust.103 "Reasonable attorney's fees" are 
the "actual cost incurred by the nonprevailing party for .an attorney's 
fee payable to an attorney in connection with [the] claim" or a "reason-
able cost that would have been· incurred," had the party not signed a 
contingency fee agreement.104 Fairness is one justification for this pro-
98. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text 
99. Some observers think that the revisors' inclusion of a local oplion provision in the dis-
closure revision severely eroded their credibility and national uniformity and simplicity. See, 
e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local .Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for 
Optional Rules, 14 REv. LmG. 49 (1994); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Dis-
covery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993); see also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text 
100. See supra notes 22-24, 88-89 and accompanying text 
101. Brad Bole, Congress Again Takes Up "Legal &fenn", LmG. NEWS, Fcb.-Ma.r. 1995, at 
l, 6; interview with Brad Bole, Echevarria Law Firm, in Tampa, FL (Feb. 27, 1995). 
102. See Tobias, supra note S, at 1599-1604; supra notes 25-28, 46-61 and accompanying 
text 
103. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). Similnr proposals were introduced in the fust 
session of the 105th Congress, but none were passed. See H.R. 903, 105th Cong., 1st Scss. 
(1997); H.R. 2603, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
104. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). 
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posal because it enables defendants to seek recovery of attorneys' fees 
:from plaintiffs who receive smaller awards at trial than they were of-
fered in settlement. A second is that the prospect of having to pay 
adversaries' attorneys' fees will encourage settlements and save resourc-
es of litigants and the court system. 
The foremost criticism of the modification is that it contravenes the 
premises, primarily involving access to courts, which underpin the long-
standing American Rule. Indeed, the ABA's sustained support for open 
court access and opposition to "across the board 'loser pays' without 
regard to subject matter'' led the Association to admonish that Congress 
reject this provision of the AAA. 105 The fee-shifting measure could 
restrict access by fostering much unwarranted, costly satellite litigation. 
For example, questions about how injunctive relief, which plaintiffs 
:frequently secure in public law litigation, compares with monetary of-
fers of judgment under Rule 68 and what reasonable attorneys' fees are 
under many statutory schemes have engendered considerable satellite 
litigation, some of which have even been resolved by the Supreme 
Court. 106 This provision might limit access in cases which are close, 
complex, difficult or costly to prove, or in which possible plaintiffs 
have little power or money because the exposure to liability for oppo-
nents' attorneys' fees will chill potential litigants' enthusiasm for filing 
or vigorously pursuing litigation. Parties that may function as private 
attorneys-general in enforcing products safety, consumer or natural 
resources protection statutes or policies may be particularly vulnerable 
to the impacts reviewed in this paragraph. 107 
105. Bole, supra note 101, at 6. 
106. See, e.g., Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist, 488 U.S. 815 
(1989); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986); see also Tobias, supra note 7, at 
310-16. 
107. Plaintiffs operate as private attorneys-general by, for example, pursuing cases over pollu-
tion which the Environmental Protection Agency regulates with insufficient rigor. See Tobias, 
supra note 7, at 314-17. See generally Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private At-
torney General: Perspectives .from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REY. 353 (1988). This proposal arguably interferes with state prerogatives. Insofar as fee-
shifting is a matter of state substantive law, it would federalize an area which traditionally (and 
perhaps for constitutional reasons) has been left to the states. The Supreme Court has stated 
that attorney fees are a matter of state substantive law. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., SOI 
U.S. 32 (1991); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990). 
A similar proposal was introduced in the first session of the I OSth Congress, but it did not 
pass. See H.R. 903, IOSth Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). 
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3. Modification of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
The AAA's third section would have revised Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 by limiting expert testimony, ostensibly to increase "honesty in testi-
mony."108 The provision would make admissible a witness's opinion 
which was premised on scientific knowledge only if the court concludes 
that it is (1) based on scientifically valid reasoning, and (2) sufficiently 
reliable so that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the dan-
gers specified in Rule 403.109 
These strictures could frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs in complicat-
ed products liability, environmental cases, and other fonns of litigation 
which require testimony on complex scientific questions to locate ex-
perts who can testify and to prove their cases. The revision might also 
complicate the efforts of plaintiffs in these lawsuits to operate as pri-
vate attorneys-general110 and to vindicate significant purposes of some 
environmental legislation. The Supreme Court recently considered 
issues implicating expert testimony that so closely involve those which 
this provision affects that it could simply be an effort to overrule the 
Court's decision.111 
Most importantly, a legislative change of Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, as with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, would conflict with a 
continuing refonn effort. The recommended modifications in Rule 702 
appear appropriate for examination in the ordinary course of the rule 
amendment process. In the 1990s, the national revision entities enter-
tained the possibility of revising Rule 702, but failed to institute the 
alterations that the AAA would effect 112 Congressional amendment of 
an evidentiary provision would seriously compromise the principal pur-
pose in recently assembling an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evi-
dence113 and could even hann this entity's credibility before the com-
mittee could prove its value. 114 In fact, when the ABA opposed legis-
108. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995). 
109. See id. 
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text 
111. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
112. See 1991 Proposed Amendments, supra note SO, 137 F.R.D. at 156 (proposing amend-
ment); see also _Supreme Court of the U.S., Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence. Excerpt 
from the Report .of the Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice ll!ld Procedure, reprillted in 
147 F.R.D. 275, 282 (1993) (stating that the proposed amendment of Ruic 702 was referred to 
the new Advisory Committee). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991). 
113. See supra note 22. 
114. See supra note 112. 
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lative revision of Rule 702, the organization stressed that alteration of 
the "Federal Rules of Evidence should be left to the existing 
rulemaking bodies."115 
C. Products Liability Reform 
The products liability reform measures which the 104th Congress 
considered would have significantly changed substantive products liabili-
ty law, while the major proposal that the 1 OS th Congress is examining 
will do so. Most important to this Article are restrictions on seller lia-
bility for harm which is ascribed to defective products in numerous 
circumstances116 and requirements that plaintiffs only recover punitive 
damages when they prove by clear and convincing evidence that defen-
dants acted with "conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights of safety 
of others" and that such damages generally be capped. 117 The major 
rationale for limiting seller liability is that plaintiffs sue sellers in a 
large percentage of products lawsuits, but sellers are ultimately held 
liable in few cases. 118 The principal reason for restricting punitive 
damage awards is that allowing juries to assess the damages, especially 
pursuant to ambiguous or overly lenient criteria, can expose defendants 
to enormous liability. 
One problem with reducing sellers' liability is that it could elimi-
nate any local defendants and the only parties that might eventually be 
found liable for plaintiffs' harm. 119 The difficulty with limiting puni-
tive damages is the loss of punishment and deterrence that can result in 
situations when defendants deserve such treatment. These and addition-
al aspects of the products iiability measure could restrict federal court 
access and impose other disadvantages, such as reducing the number of 
lawsuits in which plaintiffs act as private attorneys-general. 120 Insofar 
115. Bole, supra note 101, at 6. 
116. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 103(8) (1995). A similar proposal was introduced in the 
first session of the 105th Congress, but it did not pass. See S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 
103 (1996). 
117. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108 (1995); see S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1996). 
Congress deleted from the final version of H.R. 956 provisions, such as a special Rule 11 for 
products cases, which were more "procedural" in nature. See Tobias, Common Sense, supra 
note 61, at 732-33; see also H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 107 (1995) {prescribing special ADR 
procedures); S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1996) (same). 
118. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 65, at 795 n.4. 
119. The limitation on joint liability for noneconomic damages could exacerbate this situation. 
See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 110 (1995); see S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1996). 
120. See supra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text 
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as the proposal's provisions would modify products liability substantive 
law, they could also interfere with the ALI's recently-completed section 
402A of the Restatement Third. 121 
ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUIURE 
A number of ideas which I explored above suggest that Congress 
must eschew or delay passage of the AAA and the products liability 
reform measure while reconsidering, and perhaps modifying, the 
PSLRA. · During the first session of the 105th Congress, Congress 
should have scrutinized CJRA experimentation, clearly prescribed the 
statute's expiration, and facilitated the JIA's revitalization and compre-
hensive implementation. Although the first session of Congress did not 
institute these actions, the second session should. 
A. Rejecting, Postponing, or Modifying Legal Reforms 
1. Effects on Continuing Reforms 
Passage of the AAA and the products liability proposal would, as 
the PSLRA's adoption did, complicate, disrupt, or threaten several con-
tinuing reform efforts. The CJRA's enactment, a mere two years after 
the JIA's passage, exemplifies both the need to be cautious and the 
dangers of legislating without accounting for prior reform initiatives. 
Congress adopted the 1988 JIA because the federal bench and Congress 
recognized that local procedural proliferation was complicating civil 
practice and undercutting the national rule revision process which had 
served the nation well for .a half-century. However, Congress passed 
the 1990 CJRA, essentially suspending those features of the JIA which 
Congress intended to address proliferation and restore the primacy of 
the national amendment process, before they could even be effectuated. 
The AAA's enactment could, like the PSLRA's passage, have similar 
impacts on those aspects of the JIA that Congress meant to revitalize 
the national revision process. 
121. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying tc.xL The proposal's advocates favor the 
prompt unifonnity and certainty which passage would afford, even though the measure would 
cover only a small percentage of situations. The proponents may also be concerned that state 
courts and legislatures will not adopt the Restatement Third, although advocates should favor 
the Restatement's broader applicability, particularly its treatment of critical issues, such as de-
sign defect and duty to warn. Finally, to the extent that the measure treats substantive prod-
ucts liability law and punitive damages awards, which have traditionally been matters of state 
law, it may interfere with the prerogatives of state supreme courts and legislatures. 
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When Congress passed the 1995 PSLRA, it legislated before Rule 
11 's significant 1993 revision was thoroughly implemented, without 
reflecting on the expert evaluations of CJRA experimentation which 
Congress commissioned or assessing the reports and recommendations it 
requested that the Judicial Conference prepare. 122 Congressional adop-
tion of the AAA before May 1997 would have had similar effects. 
The PSLRA's imposition of special Rule 11 sanctions and Rule 23 
class action requirements in securities litigation did, and the AAA's 
enactment would, constitute direct legislative amendment of the Federal 
Rules while bypassing the carefully-crafted national revision procedures. 
Thus, like the PSLRA, the AAA would frustrate Congress' own efforts 
in the 1988 JIA to restore the primacy of that process. If Congress 
adopted the products liability reform bill today, the measure could ad-
versely affect the ALI's new Restatement Third covering products lia-
bility.123 
2. Effects on the Civil Justice System and on Specific Cases 
The adoption of new and often conflicting procedural strictures and 
the interference with ongoing reform initiatives will impose greater 
complexity, cost, and delay on the civil justice process and in civil 
lawsuits. Judges must master, construe, and enforce the requirements, 
while counsel and litigants· will have to find, comprehend, and satisfy 
them. Indeed, CJRA experimentation in all ninety-four districts with its 
diverse measures for reducing expense and delay and the large number 
of 1993 Federal Rules revisions, some of which authorized local varia-
tions from the Federal amendments, have apparently exceeded the pa-
tience of judges, attorneys, and parties for procedural modification. 
The PSLRA's enactment, and the AAA's adoption, seem likely to exac-
erbate procedural overload. Many of the substantive and procedural 
commands in the PSLRA," the AAA, and the products liability bill 
individually, but especially together, could also have adverse impacts on 
particular civil suits. For example, the AAA's proposed changes in 
Federal Rules 11 and 68 would probably limit federal court access for 
those lawyers and litigants whose dearth of power and resources makes 
them risk averse, as the PSLRA's mandates may have. 
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes {1994). The Conference considered but did not initiate na-
tional rule revision for CJRA procedures that were efficacious. See Judicial Conf. of the U.S., 
Final Report on the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, at 2, 18 {1997) (hereinafter Judicial 
Conf. Report]; see also id.; see infra note 126. 
123. See supra notes 68-72, 121 and accompanying text 
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In short, the imposition of new strictures and the interference with 
continuing reforms, which can be attributed to the PSLRA and which 
could result from the AAA and the products liability measure, may 
well have effects that are diametrically opposed to those which Con-
gress intended in passing the JIA and the CJRA. They may further 
erode the primacy of the national revision process that the JIA was 
meant to restore, while increasing the cost and delay the CJRA was 
supposed to reduce. 124 
B. Rejecting, Postponing, or Modifying Legal Reforms Thal Conflict 
With Ongoing Initiatives 
Congress may find that the PSLRA does not, and that the AAA 
and the products liability reform proposal would not, have deleterious 
effects on continuing initiatives, individual suits, or the civil justice sys-
tem; or that other reasons warrant against proceeding. If Congress so 
finds, it must seriously explore additional options. Congress at least 
should rescind or discontinue implementing the PSLRA's provisions 
which do conflict and reject, or postpone adopting those features of the 
AAA and the products liability measure that will interfere with ongoing 
reforms until the initiatives have ended, their efficacy has been evaluat-
ed, and decisions regarding the efforts' future have been made. 
By the end of 1997, all of the federal district courts had essentially 
finished the most far-reaching experimentation with mechanisms for 
decreasing cost and delay ever undertaken, while the RAND Corpora-
tion, the FJC, and the ninety-four districts had systematically assembled, 
assessed, and synthesized an unprecedented quantity of empirical mate-
rial regarding the experimentation's efficacy. During January 1997, the 
RAND Corporation issued its report on experimentation in the ten pilot 
courts, and the FJC released its study of the five demonstration dis-
tricts.125 By May, the Judicial Conference had submitted to Congress 
124. The Chair of the ABA Litigation Section summarized much above in descnoing similar 
measures considered by the 104th Congress as a "sort of hodgepodge nttempt to nddrcss per-
ceived problems with the legal systept. Quick and dirty solutions shouldn't he imposed where 
a more thoughtful approach is clearly called for." Bole, supra note 101, nt 6. 
125. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EvALUATlON OF 
JUDICIAL CAsE MANAGEMENT UNDER nm CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM Acr (1996); Do~ 
STIENSTRA ET AL., REPoRT TO nm JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CO~t>.UTIEE ON COURT ADMINISTRA-
TION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF nm FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS EsTABUSHED 
UNDER nm CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM Acr OF 1990 (FJC 1997); see also 28 u.s.c. § 471 notes 
(1994) (prescribing experimentation and evaluation). 
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its reports and recommendations on the two programs. 126 In 1997, the 
remaining seventy-nine districts effectively completed experimentation 
and were able to afford a sense of many measures' efficacy. Once this 
experimentation has been rigorously evaluated and Congress has scruti-
nized the Conference reports and suggestions, it can make better-con-
sidered determinations respecting specific strictures included in the 
PSLRA, the AAA, and the products liability proposal, as well as the 
effectiveness of numerous procedures for decreasing expense and delay. 
Moreover, the future of national rule revision and of the civil justice 
system should be considered.127 
C. Experimentation 
Congress could also investigate the possibility of authorizing future 
experimentation. Congress must keep in mind that every state has insti-
tuted, or is experimenting with, a plethora of reforms, 128 while many 
federal districts have applied numerous experimental mechanisms, the 
efficacy of which Congress will soon be evaluating. Moreover, nascent 
experience with the PSLRA's strictures, such as the special Rule 11 
and Rule 23 requirements, suggest they have limited the filing and avid 
pursuit of securities litigation. 
Should Congress find these endeavors insufficient, it could provide 
for additional efforts. For example, Congress might prescribe experi-
mentation with the AAA's offer of judgment provision in a few federal 
courts for a set time, even though this approach may disadvantage 
certain parties in those districts or encourage forum shopping. 129 The 
project could be premised on prior programs, such as experimentation 
126. See Judicial Conf. Report, supra note 122. Congress asked the Conference to suggest 
whether measures receiving pilot court experimentation should apply more broadly. If the Con· 
ference had so suggested, it was to initiate rule revision. However, the Conference rejected 
expansion. It therefore had to "identify alternative, more effective cost and delay reduction 
programs," and it might use rule revision to implement its decision. CJRA, § 10S(c)(2)(c); see 
also Judicial Conf. Report, supra, at 2-4, 18; 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1994). The Conference 
only had to report on the demonstration program results. See id.; see also supra note 122; 
infra note 137 and accompanying text 
127. Congress should remember that a lack of empirical data probably led to the two most 
controversial Federal Rules revisions-Rule ll's 1983 change and Rule 26's 1993 modification 
imposing automatic disclosure. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 32, at 192S-27; Walker, supra 
note 39, at 4S6-S9; see also supra notes 30-3S, SO-S3 and accompanying text 
128. See supra note 61. 
129. One district conducted CJRA experimentation with a similar measure, and Congress 
should consult this experience. See supra note SS and accompanying text 
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with court-annexed arbitratjon or with CJRA procedures.13° Congress 
might also facilitate wider experimentation by prescribing a 1991 pro-
posed amendment in Federal Rule 83 that the national rule revisors 
withdrew.131 
D. Reasons for Suggestions 
Several reasons, which are sufficiently important to warrant recapit-
ulation here, suggest Congress not adopt strictures in the AAA or the 
products liability proposal which will adversely affect ongoing reform 
initiatives, specific cases, or the civil justice system. They also suggest 
Congress abrogate the PSLRA's requirements which do so. The provi-
sions may sacrifice advantages that could be gleaned from the reforms 
while imposing more complications, expense, and delay in civil suits 
and on the civil justice process. For example, the AAA's amendment 
of Federal Rule 11 in ways that would reinstitute phenomena such as 
costly, · unwarranted satellite litigation and chilling the enthusiasm of 
civil rights plaintiffs, which the national revision entities considered so 
problematic and meticulously sought to eliminate from the Rule only 
four years ago, would undercut the 1993 amendment before it was 
completely implemented and evaluated.132 Adoption of this modifica-
tion and that proposed for Rule 68 would circumvent the national revi-
sion procedures and would further and unnecessarily erode this process 
at a time when its longstanding authority and respect have been seri-
130. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994); see also Pub. L No. 105-S3, § 1, lll Slllt. 1173 
(1997). See generally BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER. COURT-AN· 
NEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990). The work must be coordinated with 
the CJRA's conclusion. For example, CJRA measures that had promise but were not effective 
enough to warrant national application may deserve future cxperimentnlion. 
131. Districts with Judicial Conference !!pproval could have c.'(Jlerimented for five years with 
inconsistent procedures. See 1991 Proposed Amendments, supra note SD, 137 F.R.D. at 1S3. 
See generally Tobias, supra note S, at 1616, 1633. Congressional intervention in rule revision 
is generally unwise. However, legislative revision of Ruic 83 may be appropriate because issues 
of authority are implicated. See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in tk 
Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L REY. 1S67, 1585-87 (1991); see also Crurington, supra note 
48, at 1006; see also infra notes 142-44 and accompanying tc.xt (ano.lyzing proposal's benefils). 
132. See supra notes 30-43, 93-102 and accompanying text. The PSLRA's imposition of a 
special Rule 11 may have already had similar, but narrower, effects. See supra notes SS, 89 
and accompanying text The PSLRA's imposition of special class action strictures could com-
plicate the ongoing effort to amend Ruic 23. See supra notes 43, 86-88 and accompanying 
text 
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ously compromised.133 The passage of a federal products liability stat-
ute might correspondingly undermine the ALI's attempts to improve the 
Restatement of Torts and conflict with state efforts which are directed 
at products liability. 134 
E. A Postscript on the PSLRA 
I analyzed above numerous reasons why the PSLRA's passage was 
ill-advised; however, certain of those ideas deserve emphasis here be-
cause they inform understanding of the disadvantages that could result 
from the reforms which the 1 OS th Congress is presently considering. 
Perhaps most significant, the PSLRA has eroded ongoing efforts to 
restore the primacy of the national amendment process by altering as-
pects of nine Federal Rules. Indeed, the national revision entities have 
intensively scrutinized several of these provisions, namely Rules 11 and 
23, in the ordinary course of rule amendment and approved, or pro-
posed, their extensive modification. The partial legislative revisions in 
numerous Federal Rules that the PSLRA effects, thus, might have un-
dermined attempts to revitalize the national amendment process by 
avoiding it and by authorizing strictures which differ from existing 
Federal Rules. 
Many onerous substantive and procedural requirements that the 
PSLRA imposes have complicated efforts of plaintiffs to plead and 
prove securities fraud, partly by restricting their access to relevant in-
formation. The need to find, understand, and comply with the new 
strictures, particularly procedures which depart from the Federal Rules, 
has also increased expense and delay in maintaining securities fraud 
actions. The above phenomena have apparently discouraged the institu-
tion and vigorous pursuit of those cases and have frustrated realization 
of the securities laws' purposes. These factors can dissuade potential 
plaintiffs from enforcing the statutes and acting as private attomeys-
general to vindicate the public interest in reducing securities fraud by 
punishing or deterring its perpetrators. 135 
Congress, therefore, might want to reconsider, and even modify, the 
PSLRA. However, numerous members of that body may resist revisit-
ing a statute so soon after enactment when it could be difficult to as-
133. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text; see also infra Part 111.E (suggesting 
PSLRA has similarly bypassed and possibly eroded process). 
134. See supra notes 62-72, 121 and accompanying text 
135. See supra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text 
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certain with sufficient certainty the precise effects of the legislation's 
implementation. If Congress finds reevaluation and possible amendment 
premature today, it must authorize an expert entity, such as the FJC, 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), or the 
RAND Corporation to undertake a careful study of the PSLRA's im-
pacts. Once relevant empirical data have been systematically assem-
bled, analyzed, and synthesized, Congress should decide whether legis-
lative change is warranted.136 
F. A Postscript on the 199.0 CJRA. and the 1988 JIA 
I am not advocating that the 1 OS th Congress ignore the concerns 
which prompted its members to reintroduce the AAA and the products 
liability reform measure and the 104th Congress to pass the PSLRA. 
On the contrary, the lOOth and lOlst Congresses prescribed a blueprint 
for the future that is responsive to certain of the questions implicated. 
Indeed, the need to decide whether the CJRA actually did sunset in 
December 1997 affords an excellent opportunity for addressing the 
issues. 
The 105th Congress must continue evaluating the Judicial Confer-
ence reports and recommendations regarding the pilot and demonstration 
programs which the Conference premised substantially on the RAND 
and FJC studies. Congress should seriously consider how to resolve 
the CJRA's fate because the Conference tendered its reports in May 
1997 and Congress has had considerable time to study it.137 Congress 
could consult the RAND and FJC findings, which indicate that experi-
mentation with the CJRA-prescribed procedures offered no discemable 
136. Judges, when interpreting and applying the PSLRA, must attempt to hannonizc the intent 
of the 104th Congress in passing the statute and of prior Congresses in enacting C<lllicr securi-
ties laws. For example, courts should be sensitive to, and prevent, the abusive litigation prac-
tices which the PSLRA was intended to treat Judges must also nnticlpate nnd stop the above 
problems which frustrate potential pl\}intiffs' pursuit of securities fraud claims. Such difficulties 
can erode vigorous private enforcement of the securities statutes. 
137. See Judicial Cont: Report, supra note 122; see also 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1994). 
Congress could independently evaluate the RAND nnd FJC analyses, collect its ov.n data from 
the pilot, demonstration or other courts or work with the FJC or the AO which have carefully 
monitored implementation since 1990. However, such legislative efforts might prove duplicative 
and wasteful because Congress may lack sufficient resources nnd expertise nnd it has not close-
ly monitored CJRA effectuation. Congress did pass legislation which extends the reporting 
requirements relating to case dispositions in section 476 of the CJRA. but it is unclear what 
effect the 1997 measure has on the 1990 CJRA's expiration. See Pub. L No. 10S-S3, § 2, 
lll Stat 1173 (1997). 
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benefit in terms of important parameters, namely cost or delay reduc-
tion, litigant satisfaction, and fairness, but that judges who employ 
sound judicial case management practices can save time and perhaps 
expense. 138 
These determinations of RAND and the FJC suggest that Congress 
should allow the CJRA to sunset and fully implement the JIA's purpos-
es of limiting local procedural proliferation and conflicting requirements 
while restoring the primacy of national rule revision. Congress can 
best facilitate the thorough effectuation of the JIA's goals of restricting 
proliferation and inconsiste~cy by appropriating sufficient resources for 
"those entities which must review local procedures to discharge their 
duties effectively.139 
If CJRA experimentation yielded any procedures that are very effi-
cacious in reducing cost or delay and warrant national application, those 
measures could be included in the Federal Rules through the normal 
amendment process. 140 Mechanisms that limited cost or delay, but 
which were insufficiently effective to deserve nationwide implementa-
tion or as to which unce~inty remains, may be designated for future 
experimentation.141 Experimentation might also proceed pursuant to a 
1991 proposed change in Federal Rule 83 that the national revision 
entities withdrew. 142 This proposal could capitalize on experience and 
could encourage local creativity in designing promising experimental 
procedures. It would also maintain a measure of control in a central-
ized, expert entity which might coordinate the districts' work by, for 
instance, limiting the number of inconsistent local procedures and pro-
moting experimentation witµ optimally diverse measures. The approach 
could prove peculiarly efficacious in facilitating experimentation with 
case management techniques, which were apparently the most successful 
138. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 125, at l; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 125; see also 
Edward D. Cavanagh, Congress' Failed Attempt to Spur Court Efficiency: The Legacy of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996. 
139. See Tobias, Sixth, supra note 61; see also supra p. 560 (suggesting that Congress revi-
talize national revision process by eschewing legislative revision of Federal Rules which PSLRA 
and AAA exemplify because this bypasses and erodes process). The courts of appeals, the 
Judicial Conference and Judges, acting alone and through their districts, should attempt to limit 
proliferating local procedures. 
140. In this sentence and the next, I rely on supra notes 122 and 126. 
141. Judges individually, or through the Conference, should (1) identify which procedures, 
especially case management measures, deserve which treatment; (2) preserve applicable CJRA 
data; and (3) compile annual assessments that evaluate all relevant effects of CJRA experimen-
tation. 
142. See supra note 131 and accompanying text 
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CJRA procedures, 143 because judges frequently develop the mechanisms 
to treat varying local conditions, so that the measures can differ sub-
stantially across districts. 144 
CONCLUSION 
The 104th Congress considered the AAA and several products lia-
bility proposals; however, the only legal reform which in fact became 
law was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The PSLRA has 
had, and the recently-reintroduced AAA and products liability bill could 
have, a number of detrimental impacts on continuing reform efforts, 
specific lawsuits, and the civil justice process. Congress should rescind 
the PSLRA's provisions that have had these effects, or at the least, sus-
pend implementation of the statute's strictures which interfere with 
ongoing initiatives. In the meantime, it should reject the AAA and the 
products liability measure or delay adoption of their requirements that 
could conflict with continuing reforms. 
143. See supra note 138 and accompanying texl 
144. See Robel, supra note 48, at 1484; see also supra notes 129-30 nnd nccomp:inying text 
(suggesting that Congress might authorize e.xperimentntion with the AAA's provisions, as \\ith 
court-annexed arbitration, but should proceed cautiously because this could erode national rule 
revision which can better consider the prescriptions). The AAA's thorough evaluation above 
means that it warrants little elaboration here. Most importnnt, all three or its provisions can be 
considered best in the normal rule revision process, which legislative amendment would bypass 
and erode. The products liability reform measure presents n closer question principally because 
the alternatives available appear less -satisfactory. See supra note 121. 

